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THE AMERICAN CONCEPTION OF JUDICIAL CONTROL
"The Judiciary are the sole protection again'st a tyrannical execution of the laws.".
PATIcK HlENRY.

In its theoretical aspect, what is the American conception
of judicial control? Our Constitution is based on the doctrine
of the separation of powers into three departments. Article I.
deals with the legislature, the department that makes the law.
Article II. deals with the executive, Oe department that executes the law and Article III. with the judiciary, the department
'that interprets. the law. On the continent of Europe the view
is held generally that there are only two departments of government; the law-waking and the law-executing. Thefe, the
judiciary is considered as a subordinate branch of the lawexecuting department, on the theory that before a law can be
executed, it must be interpreted.
From the American point of view the thiee departments are
considered to be coordinate, although not necessarily equal in
power. In strict theory, the judiciary is the weakest of the
three departments of government. The Constitution only provides specifically for a "Supreme Court; and such inferior
courts as Congress may from time to time establish." (Art. 3,
See. 1.) Congress can determine the size, salary and procedure
of the Supreme Court and can create inferior courts and determine their sizej jurisdiction, salary and procedure. The
salary of Federal judges cannot be diminished while in office.
(Art. 3, See. 1.) The President also ha" control over the courts.
Federal judges are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. In the Grossman case, decided
March 2, 1925, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the President has unlimited power under the Constitution
to pardon persons held guilty of criminal contempt of the Fed-
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eral courts on the theory that that power is entrusted to the
Executive by the Constitution to afford ,acheck on possible judicial injustice.
The comparative weakness of the judiciary in theory has
often been stated in this way; the executive has control of the
sword, the legislature has control of the purse, while the courts
do not even appoint and in the ultimate analysis have no control over the very officers who are to carry out and make effective their judgments and decrees. The United States Marshals
are the executing officers of the Federal Courts. Suppose a
Federal court makes a judgment or decree and the United States
Marshal refuses to execute the same. If the authorities that appointed the Marshal support him in hisposition, the court would
he helpless.
There have been a few exceptional cases where other departments have refused to cooperate with the judiciary, and the
result has been that the court was placed in an embarrassing
position. In 1802, Congress at the instigation of President
Jefferson, the arch enemy of John Marshall, suspended the sessions of the Supreme Court for more than a year by abolishing
the August term. In 1832, when the state of Georgia defied the
decree of the United States Supreme Court in a case involving
the status of the Cherokee Indians, the other departments of the
Federal government gave no aid and President Jackson is reported to have remarked, "John Marshall has made the decision, now let him execute it." In 1868, in order to forestall a
decision in a case that was pending before the Supreme Court,
Congress hastily repealed the statute on which the jurisdiction
of the court depended.1
But in practice, inasmuch as the Supreme Court now has
the last word in determining the constitutionality of laws passed
by state legislatures and by Congress, it has come about that this
department, which in theory is the weakest, has been accused
of usurpation and tyranny and many now refer to the Supreme
Court as "Our Judicial Oligarchy.' '2 Hon. Walter Clark of
Ex parte McCardle, 6 Wallace, 318, 7 Wallace, 506.
See Pierson, Our Changing Constitution.
See Gilbert E. Roe's book on that title.
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the Supreme Court of North Carolina has characterized the
five to four decisions of our highest court as "Infallible Government by the Odd Man."
This leads us to a consideration of the power of the courts
to declare laws unconstitutional, generally referred to as the
power of judicial review. There has been much discussion as
to the origin, the nature and the justification of this power.
Most writers would admit that the United States Supreme
Court has the power to review state statutes. The real point
at issue is whether the Supreme Court of the United States has
the power to review and declare null and void acts of Congress.
Books have been written pro and con on this subject. We shall
only review in outline the main contentions.
Justice Marshall in 1803 in the famous case- of Marbury v.
MadisonO, laid down the doctrine of judicial review of Congressional acts, a doctrine which has been followed ever since.
His argument might be paraphrased as follows: The Constitution is the Supreme law of the land. As a corollary, the powers
of Congress must be limited and be subordinate to the supreme
law. It is the function of the judiciary to interpret the law.
Hence it is their function to determine whiether an act of legislation conflicts with the Constitution, and if there is a conflict, the Constitution being the supveme law, must prevail, and
the act of Congress must be declared null and void. In support of his main thesis, he introduced two additional arguments,
first the oath which Supreme Court judges take to support the
Constitution, and second, he stated that courts must exercise
!his power in order to uphold the terms of a written Constitution. Prof. Corwin has ably summarized the Marshall doctrine
as follows: "Since the Constitution is law (Art. 4, Par. 2) it
must be interpreted and enforced by the judges in cases 'arising' under it (Art. 3, See. 2, Par. 1). Since it is 'supreme law'
(Art. 4, See. 2) the judges must give it preference over any
other law.' '4
This decision has been subject to very bitter criticism. In
the literature of protest, perhaps the two most convincing criticisms have been presented by Gilbert E. Roe and Justice Gib21 Cranch., 137.
' Corwin, The Constitution and What it Means Today, p. 67.
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son. Mr. Roe in "Our Judicial Oligarchy" points out that the
Constitution does not give the Federal courts this power in
specific terms. He next argues that the power cannot be implied because an implication to that effect would be contrAry
to the fundamental doctrine of the separation of powers and
shows from Madison's Journal of the Convention that no motion
was ever introduced specifically giving the c6urts this power.
It is true that Madison introduced a motion three times to give
the Supreme Court in conjunction with the President, authority
to pass upon legislation before it was finally adopted, and to
give Congress the power to iepass it by a two-thirds vote over
this joint veto, but the motion was defeated. In W4s analysis
of the Marshall argument,, Roe shows that the legislative .and
executive officers take the same oath as the members of the
Courts. He further argues that it is not necessary in order to
maintain a written constitution, that the courts be given this
pyower; witness the continental countries of Europe operating
under written constitutions where the doctrine of judicial review is absent. And finally he tries to show that Marshall assumed the whole case when he said, "If there is a conflict."
The whole question at issue is, Is there a conflict, and who is
going to make that determination ?
Justice Gibson in a dissenting opinion in-the case of Eakin
v. Raub4%/ (1825) asked the defenders of the Marshall
doctrine, some embarrassing questions. If the Constitution is
supreme, on what ground does the equrt insist that its judgment is superior to the legislature that made the law? If such
a power is necessary to uphold the terms of a writtepi Constitution, why do not the courts in the continental countries of
Europe have this power? And finally, why should a legislative
act, passed in due form, following all the laws of procedure, be
held as never having been passed at all and as void ab initio?
It would seem that Marshall weakened his case by introducing the argument based upon the nature of the oath and the
argument to the effect that the courts must exercise this power
in a dountry operating under a written Constitution. On the
later point, however, it must be said that .the principle of judicial review is making some headway in other countries. A dis9A112 Sergeant v. Rav Z, 3S0.
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tinguished French authority, Leon Duguit, says, "If European
jurisprudence does not yet admit that a court can annul a
statute for violating a superior rule of law, it very clearly tends
to admit the plea of unconstitutionality to any interested party
. French jurisprudence will certainly be led by sheer
force of facts to this conclusion.'' 5 Another great French jurist
has argued that a judicial' power to declare, laws invalid exists as a matter of course, in the absence of express constitutional declaration to the contrary.6 Prof. Borchard says, "Full
judicial control over legislation appears to exist in Argentina,
Greece, Norway and Rumania. In Austria, Canada and South
Africa it is more limited. In Portugal, Nicaragua, Honduras,
Panama, Cuba, Haiti, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Paragua, and
Bolivia, the constitution expressly provides that.the courts shall
disregard unconstitutional laws, but in some of these countries,
Haiti for example, the power is never exercised, and in others
(Bolivia and Costa Rica) the~legislature has power to construe
the constitution.'"
From the standpoint of abstract logic, Marshall's critics
occupy a strong position. But there are certain historical
considerations that give support to the Marshall doctrine.
FmsT, CoLoNiAL PRECEDENTS. In 1769 the Privy Council
in England annulled an act of the legislature of New York
colony on the ground that it conflicted with Magna Charta. In
1782 a colonial court in Virginia declared an act of the colonial
legislature void because it conflicted with the charter of the
colony.
SECOND. State courts exercised this power of judicial review before the Supreme Court of the United States came into
existence.8
THIR. At least seventeen of the fifty-five men in the Constitutional convention expressed themselves in favor of the doctrine of judicial review. Professor Beard has shown that from
the standpoint of character, ability, diligence, and regularity
of attendance, these seventeen constituted the dominant element
' Law in the Modern State, p. 89-93.
4Gaston Jeze-Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique,
Vol. 29 (1912); p. 137.
' Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, p. 129.
'Bryce, American Commonwealth, Vol. 1, p. 250.
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among the thirty-nine who actually signed the Constitution. 9
The leaders who directly or indirectly declared for judicial review were Blair, Dickinson, Ellsworth, Gerry, Hamilton, Johnson, King,. Madison, Martin, L. Mason, Morris, G. Morris, R.
Paterson, Randolph, Washington, Williamson and Wilson.
FouRTH. Altho Marbury v. Madison (1803) may be considered a novel exercise of the doctrine of judicial review, as
applied to acts of Congress, Marshall knew full well that the
doctrine itself was not novel. In the Virginia ratifying convention he said, "Has the government of the United States power
to- make laws on every subject? .
Can they make laws
affecting the mode of transferring property, or contracts, or
claims between citizens of the same state? Can they go beyond
the delegated powers? If they were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated it would be considered
by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they
are to guard. . . . They would declareit void. "10 Marshall
no doubt was familiar with the case of Hylton v. United
States," decided in 1796, before he was a member of the Supreme Court, wherein the right to pass on the constitutionality
of acts of Congress was recognized and expressed, altho in that
particular case, the court conceived the statute to be constitutional. Finally it might be 'argued that the doctrine of judicial
review is nothing more than the logical development of the common law principle of ultra vires.
Professor Burgess has attempted to present a more fundamental explanation to account for the doctrine of judicial review. He says, "We must go back of statutes and Constitutions for the explanation. It is the consciousness of the people
that law must rest on reason and justice; that the Constitution
is more fundamental than legislative acts and that the judiciary
is a Vetter interpreter Qf those fundamental principles than the
legislature. "11%
If the record would show that our Supreme Court since
Marbvry v. Madison had scrupulously followed the limitation
laid down by Marshall in that case to the effect that the power
'The Supreme Court and the Constitution, p. 17ff.
Elliot's Debates, III, p. 553.
'3 Dallas, 171.
U1%Political Science and Constitutional Law, (1920), Vol. II, p. 365.
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of judicial veto should be exercised only in a clear and urgent
case, we believe that very little criticism of the Supreme Court
would have been heard. The limitation might be stated in another way as follows: if a statute properly admits of two interpretations, one of which makes it valid and the other invalid, it
is the duty of the court to uphold the former interpretation and
thus give the benefit of the doubt to the legislature that made
the law.
One cannot read the great work of Charles Warren, "The
Supreme Court in United States History," without being convinced that in peace time at least, our highest court has afforded
a real protection against Congressional usurpation. Most students would agree that the Supreme Court of the United States,
altho safeguarded against popular passion, has been more progressive and responsive to modern ideas than many state courts
with elective judges. In one hundred and thirty-five years of our
national existence, the Supreme Court of the United States has
held fifty acts of Congress unconstitutional; nine of those decisions have been made by a bare majority and perhaps a
dozen have evoked more than casual criticism. From 1789 to
1863 only two acts of Congress were declared void. During the
period from 1863 to 1870, eleven acts were- held to be unconstitutional. Since 1870, thirty-seven acts have been nullified
by the Supreme Court.
In times of peace both radicals and conservatives have
agreed that there is a substantial judicial protection, save only
when the decision went against them. In the early days, the
Anti-federalists looked to the power of judicial review as their
chief protection against the expansion of the Federal Government at the expense of the states, and their criticism of the court
was not because of the exercise of the power of judicial review,
but because of a failure to exercise it. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were protects occasioned by the failure of the
Supreme Court to hold the Alien and Sedition laws unconstitutional.
Prior to the Civil war the two most criticised decisions were
3
Marbury v. Madison12 and Dred Scott v. Sanford.1
It is inter1 Cranch., 137.
2119 Howard, 393.
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esting to note that in both of these cases, the immediate criticism was not aimed at the power of judicial review per se.. In
the former, the conflict was between Jefferson and Marshall,
not between the legislature and the court. In the latter, the
criticism was aimed at the attempt of the Supreme Court to
settle a political question by an obiter utterance.
The role of the judiciary in peace time can be illustrated by
a review of some of the leading cases since the Civil war wherein
the Supreme Court of the United States has protected the citizen from arbitrary Congressional acts that were in conflict with
the Bill of Rights.1 4 In 1870, in the case of Justices v. Murray,15 the Supreme Court declared void an act of Congress that
attempted to authorize the retrial in a Federal court of facts
that had been tried and settled in behalf of the plaintiff in a
state court, thus preventing an invasion of the Bill of Rights.
Congress later tried to authorize illegal searches and seizures
of private papers and was prevented by the Supreme Court in
Boyd v. U. S. (1886). 16
In 1890, in the case .of Wong Wing v. United States,17 the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Congressional 'act
which attempted to authorize the imprisonment of persons at
hard labor without an indictment by a grand jury. In 1892, in
the case of Counselman v. Hitchcook,18 another invasion of the
Bill of Rights wag nullified by declaring void the act of Congress which attempted to authorize a criminal prosecution of a
man after compelling him to testify before a grand jury. The
next year in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,'9
Congress was prevented from taking property for a public use
without due and full compensation. In 1909, the Supreme
Court in the case of United States v. Evans, 20 thwarted the attempt of Congress to allow an appeal by the government in a
criminal trial after the accused had been found not guilty by a
jury. In 1917 in Marslwud v. Gordon,2 ' the House of Repre-

"See speech of Charles Warren in Oh. Law Bulletin And Reporter,
Vol. XXII, No. 32, p. 507.
9 Wallace, 274.
"116 U. S. 616.
11163 U. S. 228.
142 U. S. 547.
148 U. S. 312.
20213 U. S. 297.
=243 U. S. 521.
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sentatives attempted to imprison a man without a jury trial for
publishing a letter containing matter alleged to be defamatory
of the House, and was prevented by the Supreme Court.
The conclusion should not be drawn that all of the constitutional limitations are judicially enforceable. At this point it
is essential that an analysis of the legitimate scope of judicial
power be undertaken. Let us begin by stating some of the
things outside of the legitimate judicial function. First, it is
not the function of the courts to attempt to settle moot questions
or to give advice. 22 In the second place, there has arisen in
American constitutional law a type of case where the courts
will not take jurisdiction on the ground that it involves, a "political question," the determination of which belongs to, the political departments, i. e., the President or Congress. The following
are typical illustrations of "political questions;" which of two
contending governments in a state is the legitimate government;23 whether the government of a state is republican in
form;24 whether or not a treaty is terminated by violation of
one of the parties;25 until political departments have acted, the
courts will apply voidable treaties.2 6 Other "political questions" are: the recognition of territorial limits, 2 recognition of
insurgency,28 recognition of belligerency, 29 recognition of Civil
war by Presidential proclamation of blockade,3 0 the recognition
of new governments, 3 ' the recognition of new states,32 and the
33
termination of war.
However there is no justification for the conclusion that
governmental power is unlimited in this whole field of cases involving "political questions," simply because there is an absence of judicial control. If the constitutional mandates and
prohibitions are clear and unambiguous they should effectively
bind the political departments, the members of which have
=Muskrat v. U. S., 219 U. S. 346.
2 Lut7her v. Bordon, 7 Howard 1.
2 Pacific Telephone CJo. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118.
2 Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 261.
" Charlton v. Kelly, 29 U. S. 447.

" Jones v. U. B., 137 U. S.203.

" The Three Friends, 116 U. S. 1, 63.
.*U. S. v. Palmer,3 Wheat. 610.
"The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635-690.
The Sapphire, 11 Wall. 164.
31The Nereide, 9 Cr. 388.
3The Protector, 12 Wall. 700.
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taken the oath to support the Constitution. Even in this field,
limitations and restraints would have the same validity and effectiveness on governmental agencies as corresponding limitations and restraints would have in continental constitutions.
Third, there is another type of case arising out of discretionary acts of public officials which cannot be classed strictly
as involving a "political question." In these cases, if no gross
abuse of discretion can be shown, the courts will refuse to interfere with the decision of the administrative officer. The
Supreme Court had this in mind when it said, "It is indeed
quite true that there must always be lodged somewhere, and in
somne person or body, the authority of final decision; and in
many cases of mere administration the responsibility is purely
political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the
public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or
34
by means of the suffrage.
Fourth, it should be noted that the Supreme Court of the
United States in the Insular cases, in order to justify legislation
that was deemed expedient for the backward peoples in certain
of our territories, actually restricted the operation of the Bill
of Rights. If this line of decisions is to be followed, it will
mean the continuance of a self-imposed limitation on the scope
of judicial control. In order to accomplish this result, the court
was forced to create two fictions; first that the Bill of Rights,
contained in the first eight amendments, could be classified into
two groups, those rights that were fhndamental and those that
were merely procedural, and second, a technical distinction was
made between "incorporated" and "unincorporated" territory,
the court holding that the Constitution does not inherently and
of its own vigor apply to the territories of the United States except and until it is made operative by an act of Congress and in
such eases only so much of the Constitution as the act itself
directs shall govern. The result of the Insular cases broadly
speaking is to deprive the peoples of the "unincorporated" territories of those guarantees in the Bill of Rights which the courts
have classed as "procedural."
This doctrine was first stated as
a dictum by M r. Justice Brown in Downes v. BidweZl*35 He said,
"We suggest, without intending to decide, that there may be a
34Yc

Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356.

21182 U. S. 282.
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distinction between certain natural rights, enforced in the Constitution by prohibitions against interference with them and
what may be termed artificial or remedial rights which are peculiar to our own system of jurisprudence." This dictum, became the basis of decision in later cases. 86
These legal fictions were never anticipated by the framers
of the Constitutioni The creation of an American empire and
the domination of "subject" peoples was foreign to their philosophy. Gouverneur Morris, writing to Henry Livingstone at
the time of .the purchase of Louisiana discloses the fact that in
wording Art. 4, Sec. 3, Clause 2, giving Congress the power to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory of the United States, that he,intended to use
language which would have allowed the United States to acquire territory and rule the inhabitants thereof as a subject
people. He says, "But candor obliges me to add my belief that
had it been more pointedly expressed a strong opposition would
have been made.' '3 Morris knew the temper of the Convention
and knew that the Constitution, with such a provision would
probably have been rejected.
The Insular cases express a very dangerous doctrine. There
is no constitutional sanction for this distinction between essential and non-essential provisions in the Bill of Rights. If the
highest court in the land can declare one provision non-essential
in an "unincorporated" territory, what limitation is there on
the power of that court to place all of the provisions of the. Bill
of Rights in the same category? There is no legal or historical
basis for this distinction-it is purely arbitrary. This is demonstrated by the fact that in criminal cases, trial by' a common law
jury has been classified as a mere formal procedural right,38 altho
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution the right of a
man to a trial in a crininal case by a jury of his peers was considered one of the most sacred and fundamental rights of all.
This curious evolution of jury trial from a fundamental to a
merely formal and procedural right has been interestingly traced
by an eminent member of the New York Bar.39
"HawU v. Mal chi, 190 U. S. 197.
11Quoted in Pierce, Federal Usurpation, p. 264.
2'Hawit v. ManJkichi, 190 U. S. 197.
"Certainty of Justice, Chap. 4, Frederic D. Coudert.
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Starting then with the proposition that the court- can adjudicate only bona fide cases over which it has jurisdiction,
suppose we assume that such a case comes before the court and
that the only question involved is the interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision. The next question that
arises is, what is the legitimate scope of the interpretative function of the court?
A distinguished legal scholar has said that the members of
our highest court should not only be great jurists, but statesmen
as well. In making this statement, he had in mind the class of
cases arising under the "due process" clause. No precise all
inclusive definition of due process can be formulated. In its
very nature it must be vague and indefinite and hence the Supreme court may be said, in this class of cases to exercise legislative power of a negative character, in declaring an act of
Congress or of a state legislature null and void. This statement,
if properly understood and properly limited, need not be objectionable.
But unfortunately it is not properly understood and not
properly limited. Radical theorists have seized upon the idea
that the courts are legislating generally. Such great authorities
in the law as Pound and Cardoza and Holmes deny it. Dean
Pound says of the lay critics that "they overlook as a rule the
important difference between the process of legislative law making and the process of incidental selection of legal materials and
giving them shape as legal precepts, which is involved in not a
little of judicial decision. The latter may be called judicial
law making without any reflection upon the courts." 40 In another place he says, "In Jhering's apt phrase, the process is one
of juristic chemistry- but the chemist does not make the chemicals which go into his test tube." 4L
Judge Cardozo has well said, "Law suits are rare and catastrophic experiences for the vast majority of men, and even when
the catastrophe ensues, the controversy relates ihost often not to
the law, but to the facts. In countless litigations, the law is so
clear that judges have no discretion. They have the right to legislate within gaps, but often there are no gaps. We shall have
a false view of the landscape if we look at the waste spaces only,

"Law

and Morals, 1924, p. 54.
".36 Harvard Law Review, 641.
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and refuse to see the acres already sown dnd fruitful. I think
the difficulty has its origin in the failure to distinguish between
right and power. They (the judges) have the power, though
not the right, to tfavel be'yond the walls of the interstices, the
bounds set to judicial innovation by precedent and custom. "42
Justice Holmes expresses the same view when he says, "I
recognize that judges do and must legislate. But they can do
so only interstitially; they are confined from niolar to molecular
actions. 1143

The fact that the-number of those who "have a false view
of the landscape" is on the increase cannot be denied. Not only
is there a widespread -belief in the lqnd that the Supreme Court
is legislating generally, but also many people are beginning to
consider that tribunal to be a popular representative body afid
in criticising it are .attempting to judge it by stgndards that
are applicable only to a legislative body. Nothing could be further from the truth. The members of our Supreme Court ate
not and never were intended to be popular representatives. The
need of a third legislative chamber never occurred to the f amerf
of the Constitution. Courts were established to determine the
law as it is, not as it ought to be. They were set up as part of
the system of checks and balances to protect minority And individual interests from the onslaughts of temporary majorities.
Patrick Henry expressed the orthodox vidw of the founders
When he said, "The judiciary are the sole protection against a
tyrannical execution of the laws;1"44 The judges do hot represent the temporary majority in'the same sense as the members
of the Legislative and Executive departments. Their tenure
for life should conclusively establish the fact that the framers
of the Constitution did not consider judges to be popular representatives. Further, in the method of appointment there is
no requirement that the choice be made by adhering either to a
geographical or a class basis. Much of the criticism of the Supreme Court today is unwarranted simply because of the failure
of the critics to make these distinctions. They are attempting
to place upon the court a burden beyond its legitimate power.
The Nature of -the Judicial Process, pp. 128-9.
Southern Paciflc v. Jenses, 244 U. S. 205 (1917).
Elliot's Debates, III, 324.
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It should not be understood that the writer conceives the
Supreme Court always to be in the right and its critics always
in the wrong. On several occasions our highest court has
usurped power and has actually legislated and in so doing has
placed itself in an indefensible position. It is our desire, however, to expose some of the shallow thinking that has led to an
unwarranted criticism of the Supreme Court.
There is a fundamental difference in the very nature of
the action of a court (1) in interpreting a statutory or constitutional provision which-is vague and ambiguous from that of
(2) attempting to repeal or modify a concise and definite statutory or constitutional provision. The unwary who are unable
to grasp the distinction will characterize the court in both cases
as "interpreting'" or in both cases as "legislating" as it suits
their interests. Actually the court in the first case is ,performing
one of the primary and legitimate functions of the judicial department; that of interpreting the law. In the second case, the
court is usurping power an'd is assuming the role either of a
legislative or a constitutive body.
In order to make our position clear we wish to refer to
the Supreme Court's attitude toward two great anti-trust statute§, the Clayton act and the Sherman act. With reference to
the first, we shall analyze the decision of the court to the effect
that the Clayton act does not exempt labor unions from the
Sherman act and with reference to the second, we shall examine
-the so-called "Rule of Reason." Labor sympathizers, failing
to realize the distinotion between interpretation and legislation,
vehemently criticized both decisions. As a matter of fact, the
criticism of the latter was deserving, but that of the former was
wholly unwarranted.
The circumstances surrounding the passage of the Claytoni
act establish the charge of moral cowardice, on the part of Congress when confronted with a powerful labor union lobby. For
fbur years, pior to the passage of the Clayton act, labor unions
had sought specific exemption from the provisions of the Sherman law by an amendment to it stating that it should not apply
to them, but they had never succeeded. When the Clayton act
was in commitiee, labor asked Congress to give it a clear-cut
exemption from the operation of the Anti-trust laws, but Con-
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gress tho unwilling to do this, lacked the courage to express
its real conviction. On the contrary, Congress wrote into the
Clayton act the weak and hypocritical section 6 which was
merely decla'ratory of the law as it already existed and which
protected ony the "legitimate" objects and "lawful" methods
of labor unions. Then in order to throw a sop to labor, it completed its perfidy by inserting the high-sounding sentence to
the effect that "the labor-of a human being is not a commodity
or an article of commerce." 45
The more intelligent members of Congress not only must
)ave realized that that body was guilty of a dishonorable act,
but also they must have known that the Supreme Court of the
United States would be made the object of an unjustifiable attack when that body came to interpret the law, (in the only legitimate way it could interpret it) to the disillusionment of the
labor forces. The leaders of the American lAderation of Labor
and many lesser lights, conceiving the conrt to be a legislative
body launched a tirade against "Our Judicial Oligarchy." Congress, the only culprit in the case, escaped the wrath of the
labor sympathizers.
Now ret us turn to the Standard Oil and American Tobacco
cases in which the Supreme Court laid down the:"Rule of Regson.' '0 These cases were brought under the Sherman act of
.1890 in which a prohibition is laid upon "every contract or combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, br with
foreign nations." In the early cases, the law was construed
literally, so as to include every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade. In United States v.
Trans Missouri FreightAssociation,47 decided in 1896, the court

said,
"We are asked to hold that the act of Congress excepts contracts
....
In other
which are not in unreasonable restraint of trade. .
words, we are asked to read into the act by way of judicial legislation
an exception which is not placed there by the law-making branch of the
government, and this is to be done upon the theory that the impolicy
of such legislation is so clear that it cannot be supposed Congress intended the natural import of the language it used. This we cannot and
ought 'not to do."

"See article by author in Washington Univ. Studies, 1924, "How
far is the theory of trust regulation applicable to labor unions?"
"Uitandard Oil Co. of N. J. v. U. H., 221 U. S. 1.
"166 U. S. 290, 340, 351.

KNTUCKY LAw JOURNAL

But on May 15, 1911 when the Standard Oil case was decided, the court held that it was necessary to find a restraint
of trade or commerce unreasonable before it could be condemned
as within the prohibitory provisions of the Sherman act. Here
the coi!rt usurped the power of legislation and read into the
Sherman act the word "unreasonable," and thus the big business interests gained a victory, a virtual amendment oi the act,
which thru their powerful Congressional lobby, they had been
unable to secure for a period of twenty-one years.
This decision cannot be explained on the ground that the
court was merely giving a reasonable interpretation of the statute. If that "is what the court meant by its 'Rule of Reason'
it meant no more than that it dcted as courts have acted from
time immemorial, and as they always must act in construing a
statute whose meaning is not precise. In such a case the emphasis on the "Rule of Reason" as a principle of law was utterly superfluous; it was not worth mentioning. It certainly
did not require an elaborate discussion of the common law meaning of the words "restraint of trade" on which to base its
adoption. This discussion on the other hand, was appropriate
48
to justify reading the word "unreasonable'" into the statute."
Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion4 9 openly charged that
"the court has now read into the act of Congress words which
are not to be found there, and has thereby done that which it
adjudged in 1896 and 1898 could not be done without violating
the Constitution, namely, by interpretation of a statute changed
a public policy declared by the legislative department."
We have at some length introduced this discussion of two
cases involving the question of judicial determination of the
meaning of the Clayton and Sherman anti-trust acts in order to
show in a concrete way the legitimate scope of the interpretative
function of the Supreme Court. There is little hope of intelligent appreciation or criticism of the American system of judicial
eontrol from tho~e who panupt grasp this distinction.
Let us conclude with two illuminathg statements, which if
Qnsidered together, will fford a true picture of the role of the
jiidiciary in our governmental system. De Toequeville in his
classic work "Democracy in America' written almost a century
Roberts L. Raymond in XXV, Harvard Law ReyloT, 41.
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ago stressed the utility and significance of our Supreme court
when he said, "The peace, the prosperity and the very existence
of the Union were placed in the hands of these judges. Without
thir active cooperation tjie Constitution would be a dead letter.
The Executive appeals to tbem for assistance against the encroachments of the legislative powers. The Legislature demands
their protection from the designs of the Executive. They defend
the Union from the disobedience of the states, the states from
the exaggerated claims of the Union, the public interests against
interests of private citizens, and the conservative spirit of order
against the fleeting innovations of diemocracy. ':5
Mr. Pierson in his suggestive book "Our Changing Constitution" emphasized the limitations of the judiciary when he
said, "An impression is abroad that the Supreme Court has
plenary power to preserve the Constitution. Hence the tendency
of groups to demand and of legislatures to enact, any kind of a
law without regard to its *constitutionalaspect, leaving that to
be taken care of by the court. Any such impression is erroneous and unfortunate. It puts upon the court a burden beyond
its real powers. It undermines the sense of responsibility which
should exist among the elected representatives of the people. It
impairs what someone has called the constitutional conscience,
and weakens the vigilance of the people in preserving their liberties. Men aid 'women are to be reminded that the duty of
upholding the Constitution does not devolve upon the Supreme
Court alone. It rests upon all departments of the government,
and in the last analysis, upon the people themselves." 51
FORREsT R. BIac
University of Kentucky
College of Law

OP. 78.
1
P 179.

